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JUTDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER

AUTOMOBILES.

People v. Kaufman, Calif. App., 193 Pac. 953. Construction of act requiring
driver in collision to render assistance.
Motor Vehicle Act, Sec. 21, requiring the driver of an automobile colliding
with another vehicle to render all necessary assistance, including the carrying
of occupants of the vehicle to a physician or surgeon for treatment if required,
or, if such carrying is requested, does not permit one of two automobile drivers,
equally negligent in bringing about a collision in which neither is injured, by
first demanding that he be carried to a hospital or surgeon, to put the stamp
of felony on the other refusing the request.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Gilbert v. State of Minnesota, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125. Validity of state
statute forbidding speeches discouraging recruiting.
A state statute, making it unlawful to utter words in a public meeting
which tend to discourage recruiting in the military or naval forces, is sustainable during the time of war under the police power of the state to preserve the
public peace, since statements of that character at a public meeting tend to
provoke violence.
Even if the right of free speech is a natural right protected by the United
States Constitution against state action, that right is not an absolute one, and
is not infringed by a state statute, making it unlawful to discourage enlistment
in the military or naval forces at a public meeting.
Mr. Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice Brandeis. dissenting.
ENTRAPMENT.

Plue v. People, Colo., 193 Pac. 496.
Where defendant had been asked by another to procure some whisky for
friends, and did so, delivering it at the other's house, and the other did not
intend to entrap defendant, but the "friends" proved to be police officers, and
arrested defendant upon his delivery of the whisky, such facts showed no incitement or inducement by officers to violate the law, and there was no such
entrapment or instigation as to prevent defendant's acts being criminal, as a
violation of Laws 1915, p. 275.
HOmIIDE.

James v. State, Ga., 105 S. E. 56. Presumption of malice in assault with
intent to kill.
A charge on assault with intent to murder that all the rules applicable in a
case of murder except the fact of the killing apply to assault with intent to

murder was erroneous, as, in a murder case under certain circumstances, the
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law presumes malice or the intent to kill, while in a case of assault with intent
to murder, where death does not result, there is no such presumption.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.

State v. Wagstaff, S. Car., 105 S. E. 283.
Warrant.

Searching baggage without

Evidence that police officer, in the presence and with the apparent consent
of the chief of police, snatched a grip away from prosecuting witness to search
it for intoxicating liquor, though the officers had no search warrant and did
not testify that they had reasonable cause to believe or did believe the grip
contained liquor, is sufficient to take to the jury the issue of the guilt of both
officer and chief of simple assault.
PARDON.

Ex parte Ray, Okla., 193 Pac. 635.
effective.

Pardon granted by mistake; when

By mistake of the warden of the state penitentiary, the governor was notified
that the term of imprisonment of petitioner would expire on and with the 25th
day of November, 1920. Acting upon such misinformation, and pursuant to
the custom of the governor upon recommendation of the warden, the governor,
on the 24th day of September, 1920, forwarded to such warden what purported to be a full and free pardon to petitioner, restoring unto the said petitioner all the rights of citizenship, with the provision in the face of said purported pardon that it was to take effect on the 25th day of October, 1920. It is
clear from the recitals contained in said purported pardon that the same was
forwarded.to the warden under the following mistaken impressions of fact:
(1) That the prisoner had been committed to serve only one term of six years
for one embezzlement committed by him; (2) that such term would expire on
and with the 25th day of November, 1920. Also it is clear from the face of
the purported pardon that -it was the intention of the governor only to grant
petitioner a pardon to take effect a certain number of days (to wit, 30) prior
to the expiration of his term, as an additional reward for good conduct and
days worked. Prior to the date such purported jardon took effect, and after
its having been forwarded to and received by the warden of the penitentiary,
the governor recalled the same, took it into his possession, where the same has
remained ever since the 21st day of October, 1920. Held, that a pardon is in
effect a private deed of the executive, to the validity of which delivery is
essential. Held, further, that where a full, free, and unconditional pardon
immediately operative is granted for an offense, and delivered to the warden of
the penitentiary in which the beneficiary is confined, its receipt by such warden
is in legal effect a delivery to the prisoner himself. Held, further, that an
unconditional pardon immediately operative, once delivered and accepted, cannot
thereafter be revoked except for fraud in its procurement. Held, further, that
there has been no delivery of the purported pardon relied upon in this proceeding
to petitioner or to any one for his benefit since the date on which the same was
to become a valid and operative act, and that the parties stand in the same
relative position as if the governor had indited, and had attested, a full and
free pardon to a prisoner to take effect immediately, but had never delivered
the same. Held, further, that under such circumstances the petitioner cannot
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claim thaf any benefits have accrued to him by reason of the forwarding of
such purported pardon to the warden of the penitentiary before the date on
which the same was to become effective.
SENTENCE.

Ex parte Ray, Okla., 193 Pac. 635. Allowances to prisoner sentenced for
four separate terms.
Where a convicted person is committed to the state penitentiary under four
separate sentences, providing that the term of imprisonment of the second or
subsequent conviction should begin at the termination of the term of imprisonment of the next preceding conviction, it is the duty of the warden, in computing the good time and work time to be allowed such prisoner, to compute
and allow the same under each separate term as it is served, and the prisoner
is not entitled to an allowance for good time and work time upon the theory
that he has been sentenced tp serve only a single term of imprisonment equal
to the aggregate number of years of the four sentences.
TRIAL.

People v. Bruno, Calif. App. 193 Pac. 511. Expression of opinion by the
court.
On the trial for kidnapping, the court's remark at the conclusion of an
explanatory instruction, given on request of the jury after they had been out
for some time, that he did not want to try the case again, and felt that it was
not necessary to do so, was not ground for reversal, because expressing court's
opinion, though such explanations are hazardous and might better be omitted.
Horning v. District of Columbia, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53. Comment by court
on facts.
Where the facts were established by the testimony of both the prosecution
and defendant, and showed a violation of the law, an instruction that the jury
could not capriciously say the testimony was not the truth, that it was their
duty to accept the court's exposition of the law, that the court could not peremptorily 'instruct them to find the defendant guilty, but that he would if he
could, and that the failure to bring in a verdict of guilt would arise only from
a flagrant disregard of the evidence, the law, and their obligation as jurors,
was at most a formal error, which does not require reversal under Judicial
Code, Sec. 269, as amended by Act Feb. 26, 1919 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919,
Sec. 1246).
Mr. Justice Brandeis, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice McReynolds, and Mr.
Justice Day, dissenting.
People v. Mayen, Calif. App., 193 Pac. 173. Attempt to escape; effect on
defendant's right to certificate of probable cause.
An unsuccessful attempt by one convicted of a felony to escape from the
county jail does not deprive him of his right to a certificate of probable cause,
if there was room for honest difference of. opinion as to error in the record,
nor of his right to a stay of execution until he can apply to a justice of the
appellate court for such certificate.

